This paper investigates the relation between the degree of creditors' legal protection and corporate decisions and the effects of this interaction on aggregate activity, both theoretically and empirically. We develop a two country general equilibrium model with overlapping generations. We assume asymmetric information in the credit market and we allow individuals to sign collateralized credit contracts. We show that, at the steady state equilibrium, firms rely more on external financing from banks, pay a lower price for credit and have a larger size, if located in the country which better enforces the creditor right to repossess the collateral asset. While these results rationalize some recent empirical evidence in the corporate finance literature, we obtain a new prediction for the leverage ratio, that we show to be independent of the quality of legal institutions. In the empirical part, we test our predictions using a data set at the firm level for Spain. We measure the degree of legal enforcement by using statistical information on concluded trials. We document that endowing high cost judicial districts with the best degree of legal enforcement would increase the availability of external financing and the firm's size by around 42% and 10%, respectively and would reduce the price of credit charged by banks by about one percentage point.
Introduction
A recent empirical literature has investigated the role played by legal institutions in the development of financial markets and in the definition of firm's characteristics like ownership concentration, corporate structure, volume of external finance, price of credit, share returns and firm's size. Despite the large evidence and the ongoing wide debate about the role of legal institutions, quite surprisingly, most of the empirical findings have not received a theoretical foundation yet. Moreover, most of the evidence is based on cross-country analyses, where it is difficult to separate the effects of differences in the content of laws from the ones related to differences in the enforcement of those laws.
In this paper, we focus on the enforcement feature and we show, both theoretically and empirically, that the behavior of courts in enforcing creditor rights may have important economic implications. This study contributes to the related literature in several dimensions. A viable economic mechanism through which the degree of legal enforcement of credit contracts may interact with firms' decisions is proposed and modeled using a dynamic general equilibrium framework. This turns out to be a relevant choice for two reasons. First, the analysis points out that improvements in the degree of the legal enforcement may have important general equilibrium effects, which have been overlooked so far in the extant literature. The theoretical analysis shows that a tighter legal enforcement of creditor's rights not only improves credit conditions, as one would expect in a partial equilibrium setting, but also fosters capital accumulation. Second, the ambiguous evidence on the correlation between legal institutions and firm leverage ratios (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995); Boot et al. (2001) ; Giannetti (2003) ; Fan, Titman and Twite (2003) ) finds a theoretical explanation in this paper, where general equilibrium effects play a key role.
The theoretical part is built on a two-period overlapping generations model. We assume perfectly integrated capital markets characterized by asymmetric information and segmented labor markets.
Each individual lives for two periods. In the first period, it has no initial wealth but it can work and save. In the second period, it can only choose how to invest its savings. Two alternatives are available: it can invest its savings into a banking deposit or it can start an entrepreneurial activity, which is risky. If it decides to become an entrepreneur, it will ask for a loan from the banking sector.
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , we introduce a moral hazard problem in the credit relation by assuming that the outcome of the project depends on the effort of the entrepreneur. This implies that the entrepreneur needs to invest his savings (down-payment) in the project for the credit to be provided by the bank. We consider a fully collateralized credit contract and assume that default is costly with costs depending on the behavior of courts.
According to this set-up and assuming that there are two regions (or countries) differing only in the behavior of legal institutions, we show that, at the steady state equilibrium, the country providing tighter legal enforcement has higher aggregate output and capital stock. Moreover, firms located in this country have access to a larger credit financing, at a lower price and have a larger size. But, interestingly this does not imply different firm capital structures. In fact, we find that firms located in the two countries have the same leverage ratio. The theoretical explanation for these results is based on the interaction of partial and general equilibrium effects. The partial equilibrium effect goes through the credit contract relation: a better legal protection of the creditor's rights relaxes the participation constraint of the bank and increases the availability of external finance for a given amount of entrepreneur's initial wealth. The general equilibrium effect goes through adjustments in the labor market, which raise wages. Higher wages have two contrasting effects: on the one hand, they reduce entrepreneurial profits offsetting the initial partial equilibrium benefits of a better enforcement. On the other hand, they foster individuals' capital accumulation and increase the entrepreneur's initial wealth (saving).
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Motivated by the theoretical analysis, we test a number of empirical predictions. Our investigation contains several original aspects. First of all, it improves on the existing literature from a methodological point of view, since we use our model as a guideline for the empirical analysis. This allows us not only to derive testable predictions, but it also gives us precise indications to select the explanatory variables in the estimation. Since in our model the entrepreneur takes joint financing and production decisions, we are able to distinguish endogenous variables (like firm's size, external finance, cost of credit and leverage ratio) from the exogenous ones (the legal enforcement). We are thus not allowed to use the firm size as exogenous variable in the equation for external finance or leverage ratio, unlike previous empirical studies. Under the assumption that our model is correct, including this variable would yield biased estimates of the parameters. Second, our data set allows us to isolate the effects of the legal enforcement from the ones 1 Most of the theoretical work on the implications of investor protection for corporate decisions has been done in a static partial equilibrium setting, with the exceptions of Lan and Wang (2003) and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2002) . Besides using a different theoretical framework (Lan and Wang (2003) , for example, integrate the neoclassical Tobin's q theory with the modern corporate finance literature), the two works focus on the agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and the outside minority shareholders, while we consider the moral hazard problem between entrepreneurs and creditors. Furthermore, they mostly investigate the relation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration.
related to the content of laws, by exploiting the variability in the efficiency of Spanish judicial districts within the same legal framework. Spain, in fact, offers a useful natural experiment to isolate the economic effect of differences in the degree of legal enforcement since the rules on credit relations are the same nationwide, but enforcement differs considerably across judicial districts. We measure the degree of creditor protection, by using statistical information about the distribution of concluded trials across classes of duration. This aspect of our analysis distinguishes us from most of the existing related papers, which use cross-country analyses (e.g., La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( ), (1998 Porta et al. ( ), (1999 , (2002); Modigliani and Perotti (1997) ; Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (1999); Giannetti(2003)) and rely on different measures of legal enforcement.
Third, we combine the information on the performance of judicial districts with a panel data set of firm's variables. The use of micro data to test the implications of different legal settings on firm's activity distinguishes our work from existing country-studies, which use aggregate data at regional or judicial district level to test the effects of the legal protection on the behavior of the corporate sector (e.g., Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) for the Italian credit market and Cristini, Moya and Powell (1999) for the Argentinean credit market). Moreover, the use of micro-data not only makes our analysis more robust to endogeneity problems, since decisions at the firm level are very unlikely to affect the overall economic performance or the cost of enforcement. It also allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across Spanish regions using a full set of regional dummies. This removes any concern that the coefficient of the legal variable is just picking up regional differences in social or economic factors that are correlated with our measures of legal enforcement.
After controlling for firm's characteristics, degree of concentration in the banking industry and heterogeneity at the regional level, we find that firms located in less efficient judicial districtsthe number of trials concluded after one year over the total number of concluded proceedings is higher-have access to lower external financing from the banking sector at a higher price and have smaller size. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we do not find any relation between legal enforcement and firm's leverage ratio.
This last result relates our paper to the debate about the role of legal institutions in shaping corporate financial structure. To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides for the first time a theoretical explanation for the existing ambiguous evidence on this topic. On the one hand, our cross-country comparative statics analysis predicts no differences in the firm's book leverage ratio, consistent with the empirical results of Zingales (1995), of Boot et al. (2001) and of our paper. On the other hand, our model predicts a positive effect of the legal enforcement on the firm leverage ratio in the time series.
2 This prediction is consistent with the evidence provided by Giannetti (2003) and Fan, Titman and Twite (2003) .
Our paper is also related to the empirical literature on bankruptcy costs where country analyses (e.g. Shuetrim, Lowe and Morling (1993); Castanias (1983); Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) ) find evidence of a positive correlation between bankruptcy costs and leverage ratios. However, a clear feature distinguishes our approach from these papers. While we interpret bankruptcy costs as costs related to the behavior of courts and we measure them using statistical information on concluded trials, in all these previous studies bankruptcy costs are proxied by firm's variables like firm's size.
Under the assumptions of our model, this variable depends on the legal enforcement and therefore it is endogenous. This endogeneity problem could yield biased estimates of the parameters and drive their empirical results.
In addition to the key findings presented above, this paper documents that the distortions generated by an ill-functioning legal system are not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. To quantify them, we perform the following experiment. We compute the increase in the amount of external finance and firm's size and the decrease in the price of bank credit, by endowing the least efficient judicial district with the highest degree of legal enforcement in the sample.
This change would increase the volume of external finance and firm size by around 42% and 10%, respectively. Furthermore, banks would reduce the cost of credit by about one percentage point, corresponding to a 60% reduction.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model and analyze the optimal choice of workers, investors and entrepreneurs. In section 3, we solve the model at the steady state.
In section 4, a comparative statics analysis investigates the effects of differences in the degree of legal enforcement of the creditor right to repossess the collateral asset. First, we look at its implications on firm's behavior (external finance, firm size, price of credit, leverage ratio) and then on aggregate variables (country capital stock). In section 5, we describe the data used to test our predictions, present the main results of the empirical analysis and discuss their robustness. In section 6, we conclude.
We consider an economy with overlapping generations of individuals living for two periods in two different countries, denoted by A and B.
3 In each country, in each period a new generation of mass equal to 1 is born. Individuals are risk neutral and their utility depends on the expected level of consumption in the two life-periods (c 1.
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In the first period, individuals have no initial wealth but they can work and save.
5 At the beginning of the second period, they have to decide how to invest their savings, choosing between two alternatives. They can put their money into a bank and receive a gross fixed interest rate, r t+1 .
In this case, they are not allowed to work. Alternatively, by exerting some effort, they can start an entrepreneurial activity which is risky and consists in producing the only consumption good available in the economy. If they decide to become entrepreneurs, they can ask for a loan from the banking sector. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , we introduce asymmetric information in the credit relation in the form of a moral hazard problem. We consider a collateralized credit contract, where the entrepreneur can pledge all the capital assets as collateral.
Banks collect funds (deposits) from the workers's population to finance entrepreneurs. We assume that they are risk neutral and that entry in the intermediation activity is free.
Finally, we introduce a legal system and assume that the activity of courts affects the degree of legal enforcement provided to the creditors' right to repossess the collateral asset.
Credit Contract and Legal Enforcement
In this section, we describe the credit contract relation between entrepreneurs and banks. To simplify the description, we consider the agent born in period t and we remove the superscript from all the variables. If the agent decides to become entrepreneur, in period t + 1 he has to choose the optimal amount of capital (k t+1 ) and labor (l t+1 ) to put into the production activity. If he decides to invest an amount of capital, k t+1 , then he must borrow the quantity (k t+1 − S t ) from the bank, where S t is the amount of his saving from the previous period. The realization of the production activity is stochastic. If the good state realizes, then the level of production is equal to y t+1 = min {αk t+1 , l t+1 }, otherwise the output is equal to zero. Notice that, while the capital is provided by individuals belonging to the generation born in period t, the labor units are supplied by the young generation born in period t + 1. The probability of having positive output depends on the level of effort that the entrepreneur decides to exert. 6 We assume that the entrepreneur can choose between two levels of effort, which are not observable by the bank: high effort (behaving) or low effort (shirking).
Behaving yields the probability p h of success and no private benefits to the entrepreneur. Shirking yields the probability p l < p h of success and private benefits Bk t+1 > 0. 
Limited liability is assumed. Success and failure of the entrepreneur can be observed at no cost.
After the realization of the production activity, the entrepreneur has to repay the loan to the bank and to pay the wages to the workers. We assume that there is no depreciation in the capital assets.
Following the literature on credit rationing (see Bester (1985) and Chan and Kanatas (1985) , among others), we consider a collateralized debt contract, where the entrepreneur has the possibility to pledge all the investment goods, k t+1 , as collateral to the lender. If the bad state realizes, the entrepreneur defaults on his credit contract and the bank gets the right to repossess the collateral assets. However, the enforcement of the creditor's right is not fully efficient. It requires the intervention of the judicial system, which is assumed to introduce a cost in the transaction. This cost is fully paid by the creditor through a reduction in the effective liquidation value of the collateral. We assume that the worse the performance of courts, the lower the liquidation value of the collateral asset, denoted by gk t+1 , where 0 < g < 1 (a better legal enforcement corresponds to a larger g).
The idea behind this formulation is that a weak legal enforcement corresponds to a situation where 6 We assume projects independently distributed across individuals. 7 We can interpret private benefits as a disutility from effort, which is saved in case of low level of effort. We assume that they are linear in the amount of capital goods, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) .
it takes time to enforce the creditor's right. During this period either banks have to pay legal costs, or the collateral loses part of its market value due to a positive depreciation rate.
The financial sector collects funds (k t+1 − S t+1 ) to finance the productive sector and repay a gross fixed interest rate, r t+1 , for any unit of deposits. In case the production activity is successful, the entrepreneur and the bank share what it is left from the total income after the payment of the wages to the workers: (y t+1 − w t+1 l t+1 ). The bank gets the cash-flow R b t+1 and the entrepreneur gets R e t+1 . In case of the entrepreneur's default, in principle the bank should get the min {gk t+1 , (k t+1 − S t+1 )r t+1 }. To make our analysis interesting, we assume that gk t+1 < (k t+1 − S t+1 )r t+1 for any g. A sufficient condition for that is the following:
It follows that, in case of default, the property on the collateral is transferred from the entrepreneur to the bank, which obtains a net income given by the effective liquidation value of the collateral (gk t+1 ).
Optimal Credit Contract
Let us assume that the agent has saved the amount S t in his first period of life. If he becomes an entrepreneur, in period t + 1 he has to choose the optimal amount of capital (k t+1 ), the labor input (l d t+1 ), and the optimal level of effort, taking as given the wage, w t+1 .
The objective function is the entrepreneur's expected level of consumption at the end of the second period. This function does not take into account what happens if the borrower decides to exert the low level of effort, since we assumed that the only feasible contract is the one in which the entrepreneur exerts the high level of effort.
The first condition represents the incentive compatibility constraint of the entrepreneur. It requires that the total expected utility he gets from behaving (left hand side) is at least equal to the one obtained from shirking (right hand side). To avoid the trivial cases where this constraint is not binding, we introduce the following assumption:
The second constraint is the participation constraint for the bank. The bank is willing to finance the risky project only if it is able to obtain an expected total return at least equal to the interest rate it has to pay to the investors. The hypothesis of free entry in the banking sector requires that the total expected revenues from financing the risky project (left hand side) must be exactly equal to the total costs, given by the total repayments of the deposits (right hand side). According to the optimal credit contract, the bank receives a positive return in the good state R b t+1 , while in the bad state it has the right to liquidate the collateral pledged by the entrepreneur (gk t+1 ). To make our analysis interesting and reasonable, we have to be sure that the lender's return in the good state is always larger than the maximum one it can get in the bad state for each degree of legal enforcement,
i.e. R b t+1 > gk t+1 for any g. This condition is always satisfied under assumption 2.
The last equation is a feasibility condition: the maximum amount of cash-flow that entrepreneur and bank can share can not be larger than the share of the total production which is left after paying the wages to the workers.
Solving for the optimal credit contract yields the following demands for capital and labor:
(1)
where
The denominator in equations (1) and (2) must be positive and also lower than r t+1 , otherwise entrepreneurs would not ask for loans. These two conditions are satisfied under assumption 2.
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As one would expect, both demand functions depend negatively on the wage, w t+1 and on the return on deposits r t+1 . The higher the deposit rate, the higher the loan price charged by banks to the entrepreneur. Moreover, both demand functions are increasing in the entrepreneur's savings, since larger initial wealth increases the availability of external funds and allows the entrepreneur to enlarge the production scale.
Finally, we can derive the expected return of the entrepreneurial activity. This last variable is defined as the amount of expected consumption units provided by each unit of saving invested in 8 The denominator in equations (1) and (2) is positive and lower than r t+1 , if the following two requirements are satisfied:
In principle, these two conditions must hold at any time. Since we concentrate our attention on the steady state, we only require that they hold in the steady state. This allows us to rewrite them as follows:
It is easy to show that this condition is always satisfied under assumption 2. the entrepreneurial activity:
As for the previous demand function, the rate of the entrepreneurial activity is decreasing in the wage and deposit rate. Moreover, for given w t+1 and r t+1 , it is increasing in the parameters B and (p h − p l ). Higher private benefits (higher B) tighten the borrower's incentive compatibility condition. Therefore, a larger cash-flow is required to induce the entrepreneur to exert the high level of effort. The opposite holds with an increment of (p h − p l ), since the cost of misbehaving increases.
Finally, for given w t+1 and r t+1 , a better legal enforcement increases the return of the entrepreneurial activity. The intuition is that better legal institutions relax the participation constraint of the bank and allow the entrepreneur to enlarge external financing and therefore increase the total profits, for a given amount of savings.
Worker's and Investor's Decisions
Consider now the maximization problem faced by each consumer in his first period of life, t. He has to choose the level of consumption in each period and the supply of labor. The first choice is very simple. Since he is risk neutral and does not discount future consumption, it is optimal for him to save all the income in order to consume only in the second period. In choosing his supply of labor, each agent has to compare the disutility from working with the expected consumption units he will enjoy in the second period. These depend on the wage paid in first period and on the investment return earned in the second period. Given that two investment alternatives are available, the consumer will compare the safe interest rate on banking deposits, (r t+1 ), with the expected return of the risky entrepreneurial activity, (µ t+1 ) given by equation (3), in order to choose the most profitable investment. The maximization problem faced by the consumer can be written as follows:
With this simple set up, we can easily derive the optimal level of labor supply (l s t ) and the optimal saving function (S t ):
From equations (4) and (5), we can see that labor supply and savings depend positively on both the wage rate and the investment rate received in the second period. 9 We are now able to solve for the steady state equilibrium.
Steady State Equilibrium Analysis
We consider the case in which the two countries, A and B, are equal except for the degree of legal enforcement: g A > g B . We also assume that the two capital markets are perfectly integrated, but there is no labor mobility across countries. 10 Let us denote the share of individuals who decide to become entrepreneurs in country i by π i . We can define the steady state equilibrium as a pair of wages (w A and w B ), an interest rate (r), and the number of entrepreneurs in each country (π A and π B ) which solve the following set of equations:
Equations (6) and (7) represent the equilibrium condition for the credit and the labor market, respectively. Notice that, while we need a unique equilibrium condition for the capital market given the hypothesis of full integration, we require an equilibrium condition for the labor market in each country, given the assumption of no labor mobility. Finally, equation (8) guarantees that each agent is indifferent between being a depositor or an entrepreneur.
This system has the following solution:
This set of equations implies that the share of entrepreneurs in each country is strictly positive and lower than 1. Therefore, the two extreme situations where all the individuals are entrepreneurs or depositors cannot be an equilibrium. From equations (10) and (11), it follows that a better creditor protection implies higher wages (w A > w B ). Given the assumptions of fully integrated capital markets and no arbitrage among investment opportunities, the price of capital and the return of the entrepreneurial activity must be equal across countries. Therefore, a higher legal enforcement fully translates in higher wages. Equations (10) and (11) also imply that a higher labor productivity reduces wages. This result comes from the linearity of the production function. Given that labor and capital are perfect complements, an increment in labor productivity reduces the demand for labor, for a given amount of capital.
Comparative Statics Analysis
In this section we investigate the role of the legal system. We assume that in country A courts are more efficient in enforcing the creditor's rights than in country B, that is g A > g B . We divide the analysis into two parts. First, we discuss the implications of this assumptions for firm activity, by focusing on external financing, leverage ratio, firm size and the price of credit. In the second part, we analyze the effects on the country's capital stock and output level.
The Role of the Judicial System for Firm Activity
Let us denote the amount of external financing by d i = (k i − S i ) and the leverage ratio by di ki , where i = A, B.
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Proposition 1 Firms located in country A (where creditors' rights are more strictly enforced) obtain a larger amount of external finance, have a larger size but the same capital structure (leverage ratio) as firms located in country
Proof. For reasons of simplicity, we start by showing that the size of firms located in the two countries is different. Then, we will use this result to prove the other two parts of the proposition. Manipulating equation (1), we obtain the amount of capital assets invested by each entrepreneur in each country as a function of interest rate and wage:
There are many different definitions of "leverage" in the corporate finance literature. In this model, we use the broadest one, which is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
. From equations (10) and (11), it follows that w A > w B , which im-
and
, we can rewrite the two leverage ratios as follows:
. From the two previous results, it follows that, if g A > g B , then it must also
Notice that while the amount of external finance is linear in the entrepreneur's initial wealth, the leverage ratio does not depend on it. Moreover, both external finance and leverage ratio depend on the legal variable but through different channels. A higher degree of legal enforcement in country A, by increasing the liquidation value of the collateral asset, relaxes the participation constraint of the bank and allows each entrepreneur to receive a larger amount of external finance, for a given amount of his initial wealth (positive partial equilibrium effect). Then, the higher availability of external financing increases the expected return of the entrepreneurial activity and hence also the equilibrium value of the interest rate paid on deposits. This produces a wedge between the two investment returns in country B. The safe banking investment, which benefits from the larger degree of legal enforcement, through the international capital market, provides higher profits than the risky entrepreneurial activity. Since now banking deposits are more profitable, fewer agents decide to become entrepreneurs in country B. This reduces not only the demand for capital but also the demand for labor. Adjustments in the international capital market and in the two labor markets reduce the wage in country B and increase it in country A. At the end, the benefit of a higher legal enforcement in country A (positive partial equilibrium effect) is fully compensated by a lower labor costs in country B (general equilibrium effect). These two opposite effects keep the leverage ratio constant across countries and explain why we do not find any relation between creditor's legal protection and leverage ratio between countries A and B. Notice, however, that this result, which may seem counterintuitive only if one uses a partial equilibrium approach, does not imply that legal institutions have no effects on capital structure. In fact, if we consider the time-series effects instead of looking at cross-country effects, we find that an increment in the degree of legal enforcement in country A increases the firm's leverage ratio in both countries through an increment in the return of the entrepreneurial activity. The interesting aspect is that there exists a full spillover effect on country B going through the international capital market. The increment of the international deposit interest rate raises the return of the entrepreneurial activity also in country
The two opposite effects that keep the leverage ratio constant keep also the coefficient of saving in the definition of external finance constant. This result implies that the effect of cross-country differences in the legal enforcement on the firm's external finance and capital stock goes only through differences in per capita savings (S A > S B ) driven by differences in the wages (general equilibrium effect). An increment in the degree of legal protection allows entrepreneurs to pay higher salaries.
This induces young people to work and save more. As a consequence, each entrepreneur has a larger amount of initial wealth, which allows him to receive a larger amount of external financing from the banking sector. The larger availability of external funds and the higher initial wealth allow him to enlarge the production scale buying more capital and hiring more workers.
Before going on with the next proposition, let us denote the price per unit of external finance by
Proposition 2 Firms located in the country where legal institutions are weaker face a higher price
Proof. Let us rewrite the bank's participation constraint at the steady state equilibrium in the two countries in the following way:
Then, using the result that there exists only one interest rate on deposits (given the assumption of integrated capital markets), we have the following:
, since they are the inverse of the leverage ratio (that we have shown to be equal across countries), it follows that whenever the degree of legal protection is higher, the average price of credit is lower.
The reason is that banks located in the worse legal environment must fix a higher price for external finance in order to compensate the lower amount of revenues from the liquidation of the collateral asset. Notice that, although banking financing is cheaper in country A, there will be no migration flows of entrepreneurs, even if we allow them to choose the location of their production activity. The reason is that entrepreneurs have no incentives to move, since the return of the entrepreneurial activity is the same across countries (µ A =µ B ).
12 One can show that d(
The same holds for country B, given that the two leverage ratios are equal.
In the previous section, we have shown that differences in the degree of legal enforcement across countries generate differences in the firm's capital stock. In this section, we investigate whether the same effect takes place at the aggregate level. This question is not trivial, since the supply of capital is free to move across countries. Let us denote the aggregate level of capital and output in each country by K i and Y i , where i = A, B.
Proposition 3 The country with a tighter enforcement of creditor rights has a higher aggregate capital stock and output level, i.e. if g A > g B , then
Proof. By multiplying the firm's capital stock by the number of entrepreneurs, we can rewrite the aggregate capital ratio between the two countries in the following way:
Since w A > w B , a sufficient condition for the ratio of capital to be larger than one is
for any value of z, and z 2 < z because z < 1 for any given value of g A and g B , it follows that the previous condition is always satisfied. Since the output is proportional to the capital stock, it also follows that Y A > Y B .
The intuition behind this result is that both the supply and the demand of capital are linear in savings, which are higher in country A since individuals in this country have more incentive to work and save, due to higher wages. This result parallels the one found by Castro, Clementi and MacDonald (2003) , who show that stronger investor protection implies higher growth rate and higher steady state values for both capital and output in a small economy without restrictions on capital flows.
Finally, notice that in a world with two countries and integrated financial markets, an improvement in the legal environment in one of the two countries increases the international interest rate on deposits at the steady state equilibrium:
The intuition is that a better legal enforcement relaxes the participation constraint of the bank and increases the expected return of the risky entrepreneurial activity. This drives an increment in the deposit interest rate.
Law Enforcement and Corporate Decisions

Data
To isolate the economic effect of differences in the degree of legal enforcement from the ones of the content of laws on firm decisions, we exploit differences in the behavior of civil courts across judicial districts in Spain. Spain is a civil-law country. This implies that the main attribute of the judicial system is enforcing the law. Spanish laws regulate criminal and civil offenses separately.
Correspondingly, separate branches of the judicial system deal with them. This work concentrates on civil trials in the lower and appeal courts, which are the most relevant when firms fail to honor their debts. By law, the competent court is that of the borrower's district of residence.
We draw data on Spanish firms' characteristics from the Survey on Firm Strategies, which has been performed by the Fundación Empresa Publica on a yearly basis from 1990 to 1999. We explore both cross-sectional and time-series variation. Table 1 reports the mean and the standard deviation of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The Survey on Firm Strategies provides detailed early information for 1700 private, large, medium and small size firms (listed and non-listed) operating in all the 17 Spanish regions. We have information on the production activity, like the firm's operating sector, the age of the firm, the number of workers, the total sales, the production costs and the technology. We get data on tangible assets (including machineries, plants and buildings) from the balance sheet. Data on liabilities are very detailed. We can distinguish between short term and long term stock of debt and flow of credit received during the year, towards banks or other creditors.
Moreover, data on the average cost of the different types of credit are also available. This information allows us to have a very precise measure for the amount of external finance provided by banks and for its cost.
To measure the performance of judicial districts in Spain, we use information on concluded trials from an annual survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (INE), for the years 1990-1999. Civil judicial statistics classify concluded trials in four different duration classes: less than two months, between two and six months, between six months and one year, and more than one year.
The primary sample units are the judicial districts that we aggregate by region in order to match the data at the firm level.
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We proxy the degree of legal enforcement, labelled Legal Costs, by the number of trials in the 13 The firm's survey only provides information about the location of firms by region.
last interval over the total number of concluded trials. The underlying assumption is that the longer the trial, the higher the legal costs and the weaker the legal enforcement of the creditors' rights. Table 2 reports the mean and the standard deviation of the legal variable.
Methodology
Unlike the related literature, we use our theoretical analysis as a guideline for our empirical estimation. We use the model not only to derive testable predictions, but also to select the set of explanatory variables. In our model, the entrepreneur optimally takes joint financing and production decisions, taking into account the degree of legal enforcement. We are thus not allowed to use the firm size (which is endogenous) as exogenous variable in the equation for external finance and leverage ratio. 14 Under the assumption that our model is correct, including this variable would yield biased estimates of the parameters.
To test our predictions, we pool together observations from different regions and use both the cross-section and time-series variability. We first estimate a basic specification that includes, besides the legal variable, firm's characteristics like age, age squared, 15 sector dummies 16 and a listing dummy equal to one if the firm is listed. 17 To control for the effects of the banking industry structure on credit contract relations, we include a proxy for the degree of concentration in the banking industry (namely, the Herfindal index). Other things equal, we expect banking concentration to reduce lending and raise interest rates, reflecting a less competitive credit market and possibly closer bank-firm relations, according to Petersen and Rajan (1995) . Finally, we include a full set of regional dummies to take into account heterogeneity at the regional level. In summary, we estimate the following specification:
externalf inance i,j,t = α 0 + α 1 age i,j,t + α 3 (age i,j,t ) 2 + α 3 listed i,j,t + α 4 sector i,j,t + (14)
α 5 legalcosts j,t + α 6 herf indal j,t + α 7 region j,t + i,j,t costof credit i,j,t = β 0 + β 1 age i,j,t + β 3 (age i,j,t ) 2 + β 3 listed i,j,t + β 4 sector i,j,t + (15) β 5 legalcosts j,t + β 6 herf indal j,t + β 7 region j,t + η i,j,t size i,j,t = γ 0 + γ 1 age i,j,t + γ 3 (age i,j,t ) 2 + γ 3 listed i,j,t + γ 4 sector i,j,t + (16) γ 5 legalcosts j,t + γ 6 herf indal j,t + γ 7 region j,t + θ i,j,t leverage i,j,t = δ 0 + δ 1 age i,j,t + δ 3 (age i,j,t ) 2 + δ 3 listed i,j,t + δ 4 sector i,j,t + (17) δ 5 legalcosts j,t + δ 6 herf indal j,t + δ 7 region j,t + ζ i,j,t where the index i refers to the firm, j to the region where the firm is located and t to the time period.
We assume that the error terms are identically distributed and uncorrelated across observations and with the exogenous variables. We estimate each equation by using fixed-effects regressions.
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According to our model, legal enforcement matters for corporate decisions because it affects the ability of collateralized credit contracts to reconcile the conflicts of interests between investors and debtholders. Therefore, we expect higher legal costs (namely, weaker legal enforcement) to reduce the availability of external finance (α 5 < 0) and the firm size (δ 5 < 0). Moreover, since banks located in poor legal protection regions compensate lower liquidation revenues in case of firm bankruptcy with a higher price of credit, we expect a positive relation between the two variables (β 5 > 0).
Finally, according to our theoretical predictions, we should not find any significant relation between legal costs and leverage ratio (γ 5 = 0).
Results
In the first column of Tables 3, 4 , 5, and 6, we report the estimated coefficients of equations (14)- (15)- (16) and (17) and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. In Table 3 , the dependent variable is the amount of firm's external financing measured by the logarithm of the flow of credit (long term credit) provided by banks during each year. In Table 4 , the dependent variable is the price of external finance, defined as the cost of long term credit charged by banks during each year.
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In Table 5 , we proxy the firm's size by the logarithm of the number of workers. Finally, in Table   6 we define the leverage ratio as the ratio of the total stock of debt toward banks (short term and long term debt) over the sum of total bank debt and the book value of equity.
The degree of legal enforcement is positively correlated with the availability of external finance (see Table 3 , column I). The coefficient of the legal variable is negative and significant at the five percent level. Since our proxy for legal enforcement measures the costs paid by creditors to enforce their rights, our result implies that firms located in less efficient judicial districts have access to a lower amount of external finance. This finding not only confirms our theoretical prediction, but it is also more robust than the evidence provided by Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) for the Italian credit market and by Cristini, Moya and Powell (1999) for the Argentinean market. The reason is that we use micro-data at the firm level instead of aggregate data (at judicial district or regional level). This has two main advantages. First, potential problems of endogeneity in our estimates are removed, since decisions at the firm level are very unlikely to affect the overall economic performance or the cost of enforcement. Second, we are able to control for heterogeneity across Spanish regions, since all our estimates include a full set of regional dummies.
The coefficient of the legal variable in the estimation of equation (15) is always positive and significant at the one percent level (see Table 4 , column I). Our evidence is thus consistent with the prediction that firms face higher prices for external finance if they are located in judicial districts with weaker creditor protection, since banks compensate lower liquidation revenues with higher prices. Our result is also more robust than the evidence provided by Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) . They document an ambiguous relation between price of credit and judicial efficiency in Italy once the degree of banking concentration is included in the analysis. In contrast, we find a clear positive relation between the two variables even after controlling for the banking structure. Finally, our finding parallels the evidence provided by Lombardo and Pagano (1999) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) for the equity market. This result is consistent with our theoretical predictions and it is also in line with the cross-country evidence found by Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (1999) for European firms.
In addition to the key findings presented above and consistent with our prediction, this paper documents that differences in the performance of courts do not explain differences in the leverage ratio across firms located in different judicial districts, since the coefficient of the legal variable reported in Table 6 (column I) is not statistically significant. On the one hand, this result parallels some descriptive evidence provided by Rajan and Zingales (1995) 20 or Boot et al. (2001)), although, unlike the previous two studies, our empirical analysis is able to disentangle the role of the legal enforcement from the one related to the content of laws. On the other hand, our finding contrasts with other cross-country analyses (see Giannetti (2003) or Fan, Titman and Twite (2003) ) that document a positive correlation between investor protection and leverage ratio.
The degree of concentration of the banking sector, measured by the Herfindal index, is a significant determinant of external finance, cost of credit and leverage ratio. We obtain the expected signs, suggesting that a more concentrated banking sector reduces the availability of external finance and increases the cost of credit as well as the firm leverage ratio. Both coefficients of age and age squared are statistically significant (except for the leverage ratio) and with opposite signs, suggesting that older firms (with more reputation in credit relationships) have access to larger external finance at a lower price and they are larger, although this effect is not linear. Finally, the coefficient of the variable Listed suggests that listed firms are more likely to be larger.
Interestingly, we also document that the distortions generated by an ill-functioning legal system are not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. We perform the following experiment. We compute the increase in the amount of external finance and in the firm size and the decrease in the cost of bank credit, by endowing the least efficient judicial district (Madrid) with the highest degree of legal enforcement in the sample. This change would increase external finance and firm size by about 42% and 10%, respectively. Banks would reduce the cost of credit by about one percentage point, which corresponds to a 60% reduction on average terms.
Our theoretical framework provides also a useful benchmark to interpret the estimated coefficients. Since we are estimating reduced-form equations, the coefficient of the legal variable is supposed to capture the overall effect of a change in the degree of legal enforcement, i.e., not only partial (or direct) effects but also general (or indirect) equilibrium effects going through changes in factor prices, adjustments in the entrepreneur's initial wealth, or in the technology choice. One can try to separate partial equilibrium effects from the general ones, by enlarging the basic specification of equations (14)- (17). For example, we could include Inside Equity, which represents the entrepreneur's savings in our model, into the estimated equations for external finance (see column II in Table 3 ), for the cost of credit (see column II in Table 4 ) and for firm's size (see column II in Table 5 ). We obtain coefficients of Inside Equity statistically significant in all the three specifications, with positive signs for external finance and size, and a negative sign for cost of credit, as expected. Furthermore, the coefficient of the legal variable remains statistically significant and becomes smaller in absolute terms with respect to the basic specification, consistent with our theoretical predictions. In fact, by keeping inside equity constant, we are implicitly doing two things.
First, we isolate the partial effect going through a worsening in credit contract relationships: a more stringent bank's participation constraint implies a lower amount of external finance for a given amount of entrepreneur's initial wealth. Second, we are removing a general equilibrium effect, which magnifies the direct impact of changes in the legal variables: less efficient courts would also reduce the entrepreneur's initial wealth (savings), by reducing the wages and therefore the incentives to work and save.
So far we excluded from the set of explanatory variables the degree of asset tangibility. However, other studies (see, among others, Giannetti (2003) and Fan, Titman and Twite (2003) ) find that firms with relatively more tangible assets have access to larger financial credit and are more leveraged, since tangible assets are assumed to act as collateral. Although our model does not take explicitly into account the technological choice, it is reasonable to argue that the entrepreneur optimally chooses the degree of asset tangibility jointly with external finance and size, taking into account the degree of investor legal protection. Interestingly, this argument finds empirical support not only in Claessens and Laeven (2001) , but also in our empirical analysis. We are not aware of any study that theoretically addresses this issue. However, our model could be easily extended to take into account this choice. Consider a firm that can choose between technologies using different proportions of tangible and intangible assets, which have different liquidation values when pledged as collateral to the bank. In a world without frictions, the firm would choose the more efficient technology. However, if we assume a weak legal enforcement, a firm could be induced to deviate from the more efficient technology and to choose the technology that guarantees the largest availability of external financing.
In this case, firms located in less efficient judicial districts would have a comparative advantage in choosing the technology intensive in tangible assets. Adding the degree of asset intangibility to the set of explanatory variables allows us to disentangle the direct effects of changes in the legal variables from the potential indirect effects attained through technology adjustments.
21 Tables 3 and 4 , column III, show that the degree of asset intangibility significantly reduces the external financing and increases the cost of credit, as expected. These results suggest that banks provide less external financing and charge higher interest rates to firms investing in intangible assets to compensate the lower collateral value. Furthermore, the legal variable remains statistically significant and shows a much stronger effect -its coefficient is higher in absolute terms-with respect to the basic specification, especially in the cost of credit regression. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions. By keeping the technology constant, we are removing a substitution effect that would mitigate the impact of a weaker legal enforcement. Substituting intangible with tangible assets (with higher collateral value) would partially compensate the lower liquidation value due to less efficient courts. Finally, as one can see from Tables 5 and 6 , Asset Intangibility is not significant for firm's size and leverage ratio.
Law Enforcement and Aggregate Activity
In this section, we test the prediction that a stronger legal enforcement is correlated to a higher aggregate capital stock, using aggregate Spanish data at the judicial district level from 1990 to 1996.
The dependent variable is the stock of judicial district private capital. The set of explanatory variables includes the degree of legal enforcement, the degree of banking concentration, the population size, the public capital stock and the education level.
22 Furthermore, we add a full set of judicial district dummies to control for economic heterogeneity and a full set of year dummies to control for aggregate shocks. Table 7 shows the results of our estimation. The evidence confirms our theoretical predictions.
The legal variable is significant at the ten percent level and with the expected sign, suggesting that districts where courts are more efficient have a larger private capital stock. Both the coefficients of population and stock of public capital are significant at the five percent level and with positive signs, suggesting that districts with larger resident population and higher public capital stock are also endowed with higher private capital. Finally, the education level seems to be irrelevant, probably because it is almost constant across Spanish districts.
Interestingly, the distortions generated by an ill-functioning legal system are not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. To measure the economic costs of a poor creditor protection, we perform the same experiment as before. Endowing high cost judicial districts, like Madrid, with the highest degree of legal enforcement would increase the stock of the private capital stock by about 1.4%. This result suggests that the misbehavior of the judicial system can strongly distort the development patterns of Spanish districts, by affecting the capital accumulation decisions of the private sector.
Robustness Checks
The sign of the coefficients and in general their significance level remain qualitatively unchanged if we use other proxies for the degree of legal enforcement, such as the number of concluded trials before six months. We could also use the distribution of concluded trials across the four classes of duration to construct a proxy for the average length. However, this measure would be less precise, since the last interval of the distribution is open and therefore, we would have to introduce an arbitrary assumption about the trials' length when this exceeds one year.
In our firm level estimates, we have implicitly assumed that firms do not change their location to take into account cross-country differences in the degree of legal enforcement. This assumption is justified by our model (see section 4.1). In fact, even if we let entrepreneurs choose the country where firms can be located, they do not have incentives to move. Moreover, we think that this is a safe assumption if applied to small or medium size firms, where the degree of mobility is very low.
The last column of Tables 3, 4 , 5, and 6 reports the estimated coefficients using a sub-sample of firms with less than 500 workers, which corresponds to the 88.68% of all the firms in our data set.
The coefficient of the legal variable remains statistically significant and with the expected sign in all the equations. We obtain similar results (not reported in the tables) if we include only firms with less than 200 workers, which corresponds to the 68.10% of the whole sample.
A last potential concern in our empirical analysis could be that our results are the outcome of economic heterogeneity at the regional level. The effect of the legal enforcement we are capturing would be due to social or economic regional factors that are correlated with our measures of legal enforcement. However, we believe that including a full set of regional and judicial district dummies controls for regional effects, allowing us to disentangle the effect of the quality of judicial enforcement from that of other influences operating at the regional or judicial district level.
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the existing corporate finance literature along several dimensions.
First, it proposes and models a possible economic mechanism through which the degree of legal enforcement of credit contracts may interact with the decisions of the firm. This is done in a general equilibrium framework. This choice turns out to be relevant since improvements in the degree of the legal enforcement are shown to have important general equilibrium effects, which so far have been overlooked in the literature.
The theoretical analysis is based on a two-country model with overlapping generations where asymmetric information affects contractual relations and individuals are allowed to sign collateralized credit contracts to face this problem. Assuming that the two countries differ only in the behavior of legal courts, we show that, at the steady state equilibrium, the country providing tighter legal enforcement has a higher aggregate output and capital stock. Moreover, firms located in the country where creditor rights are more strictly enforced have access to a larger credit financing at a lower price and they have a larger size. Interestingly however, this does not imply different firm capital structures. In fact, we find that firms located in the two countries have the same leverage ratio.
This paper also improves on the existing empirical related literature. First of all, it does so from a methodological point of view, since we use our model as a guideline to derive both testable predictions and precise indications on the structure of the estimation.
A second original aspect of our empirical analysis is the ability to disentangle the effects of differences in the degree of legal enforcement from the legislative ones, since we exploit the variability in the efficiency of judicial districts within the same legal framework. This allows us to test the role of the legal enforcement for the decisions of the firm. After controlling for firms' characteristics, banking industry concentration and economic heterogeneity at the regional level, we find that firms located in less efficient judicial districts receive a lower amount of external finance at a higher price, and have a smaller size. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we do not find any evidence that the degree of creditor protection affects firms' leverage ratio. Finally, we document that the degree of legal enforcement distorts the accumulation of the aggregate private capital stock at the judicial district level. In all cases, we find that the distortions generated by an ill-functioning legal system are not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant.
Our analysis could be extended in several directions. It would be of interest to introduce external equity in the model, with the purpose of studying how the three sources of finance (entrepreneur's initial wealth, external equity and bank debt) vary with the degree of legal enforcement. This extension would also require the introduction of shareholder protection in the model. A second possible extension would be to endogenize the technology choice (i.e. the degree of asset intangibility)
to study the relation between inputs characteristics and financing policy and how these two decisions respond to changes in the degree of legal enforcement.
Data Set
The firm data set is a panel coming We report the definition and source of the variables used in the estimation below.
Age, by firm (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Number of years from firm's foundation. Fundación Empresa Publica.
No. of Workers, by firm (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Total number of employees registered at the end of each 23 We are very grateful to Santiago Carbó and Francisco Fernandez for providing us with the data on the concentration of the banking sector. A complete description of these data is available in Carbó, Humphrey and Rodriguez (2003) .
year. Fundación Empresa Publica.
Total Sales, by firm (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Total sales, thousands of pesetas. Fundación Empresa Publica.
Tangible Assets, by firm (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Stock of physical assets including plants, machineries, 
3.76%
Percentage of firms with less than 500 workers
88.72%
Percentage of firms with less than 200 workers
68.10%
Age is the number of years from a firm's foundation. The variable Legal Costs is the number of civil trials concluded after one year over the total number of concluded trials. Herfindal Index is the squared sum of the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market. Stock of Private Capital and Stock of Public Capital are the stock of aggregate private and public capital and they are expressed in millions of pesetas at 1990 prices. Population is the resident population in units. Education is the number of workers with high school degree over the total working population. The dependent variable is the amount of external financing measured by the logarithm of long term credit received by banks during each year. We report the coefficients obtained through fixed-effects regressions and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression includes 18 sector dummies and a full set of regional dummies to control for heterogeneity. The dummies results are not reported to save space. The variable Legal Costs is equal to the number of civil trials concluded after one year over the total number of concluded trials. Herfindal Index is the squared sum of the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market. Age is the number of years since the foundation of a firm. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero otherwise. Column I refers to the basic specification. Column II adds the variable Inside Equity to the set of explanatory variables, while column III includes the variable Asset Intangibility. Column IV refers to a subsample of firms with less than 500 workers. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the price of credit, measured by the cost of long term credit provided by the banking sector during each year. We report the coefficients obtained through fixed-effects regressions and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression includes 18 sector dummies and a full set of regional dummies to control for heterogeneity. The dummies results are not reported to save space. The variable Legal Costs is equal to the number of civil trials concluded after one year over the total number of concluded trials. Herfindal Index is the squared sum of the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market. Age is the number of years since the foundation of a firm. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero otherwise. Column I refers to the basic specification. Column II adds the variable Inside Equity to the set of explanatory variables, while column III includes the variable Asset Intangibility.
Column IV refers to a subsample of firms with less than 500 workers. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the size of the firm, measured by logarithm of the number of workers. We report the coefficients obtained through fixed-effects regressions and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression includes 18 sector dummies and a full set of regional dummies to control for heterogeneity. The dummies results are not reported to save space. The variable Legal Costs is equal to the number of civil trials concluded after one year over the total number of concluded trials. Herfindal Index is the squared sum of the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market. Age is the number of years since the foundation of a firm. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero otherwise. Column I refers to the basic specification. Column II adds the variable Inside Equity to the set of explanatory variables, while column III includes the variable Asset Intangibility. Column IV refers to a subsample of firms with less than 500 workers. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the leverage ratio defined as the ratio of financial debt (short term plus long term debt toward financial institutions) over the sum of book value of equity and financial debt. We report the coefficients obtained through fixed-effects estimations and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression includes 18 sector dummies and a full set of regional dummies to control for heterogeneity. The dummies results are not reported to save space. The variable Legal Costs is equal to the number of civil trials concluded after one year over the total number of concluded trials. Herfindal Index is the squared sum of the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market. Age is the number of years since the foundation of a firm. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero otherwise. Column I refers to the basic specification. Column II adds the variable Inside Equity to the set of explanatory variables, while column III includes the variable Asset Intangibility. Column IV refers to a subsample of firms with less than 500 workers. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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The dependent variable is the logarithm of the judicial district private capital stock. We report the value of the coefficients obtained through fixed-effects regressions at the judicial district level and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. We also include a full set of year dummy variables to control for aggregate shocks. The variable Legal Costs is equal to the number of civil trials concluded after one year over the total number of concluded trials. Herfindal Index is the squared sum of the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market. Market shares are calculated by considering the amount of credit provided by each bank to firms and households. Population is the resident population in units. Education is the number of workers with high school degree over the total working population. Public Capital Stock is the stock of public capital including infrastructures. ***, * denote significance at the 1% and 10% level, respectively.
